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A 
The Committee on Transport hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following motion for a resolution together with explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on relations between the Community and Greece in the field of transport 
The European Parliament, 
-having regard to the report of the Committee on Transport (Doc.l-684/80), 
1. Emphasizes that, given the particular geographical location of Greece, 
the successful integrati~n of the new Member State will largely depend 
on the improvement of transport links between the Community and Greece: 
2. Believes that the accession of Greece will further increase the need for 
rapid adoption by the Council of the proposed Regulation on IUPfOrt for · 
projects of Community interest in transport infrastructure1 : -
3. Stresses, within the context of Greek accession and the transport 
implications for transit countries, the importance of the amended 
proposal for the above regulation submitted by the Commission·,in 
February 1980, extending eligibility for community support to ~ransport 
infrastructure projects to be carried out on the territory .of non-
2 
member states : 
4. Reiterates, in the light of Greek membership, the view expressed in its 
Resolution of 10 July 1980 that the transport infrastructure regulation 
should also apply to ports and airports: 
5. Considers that the adoption of the abovementioned regulation is 
rendered all the more important by the inadequacy of the Regional 
Development FUnd for the funding of transport infrastructure projects, 
particularly in the case of Greece given the economic significance of 
the Athens/Piraeus conurbation: 
6. Expects that the incor~oration of Greece into the Community quota system, 
as of 1 January 1981, will facilitate road haulage movements between 
Greece and the rest of the Community and welcomes, in this context, the 
fact that the Commission has proposed an appropriate number of 
authorizations to be accorded to Greece; 
1 OJ No. c 207, 2.9.1976, p.7 
2 See BUTTAFUOCO report (Doc. 1-218/80) 
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"I. Requests that ne'g'Oetiat ions: be opened rapidJ.y be'tween the Commtlln:Hy, 
on the one hand, and Austria and. Yugoslavia, on the other hand. in 
o..rdcr' to assure the full a:ppiiea-tion etf ex:is'ting Community transport 
regulations to tra>ffic with Greece pass:inq through. these two 
countries; 
8. Points out that the failu.£e to p~0vide f.or an effective transport 
infrastructure policy follow:inq the acc:ess'ien of· Greece will lead 
to further difficulti.es follo~ing the accass;i.m:n. o.f o.th.er Member 
Sta-tes; 
9. Considers that the increase in long-haul commercial traffic makes 
it all the more necessary to s:upport the flilrth.er dev,elopment of 
combined transport by road, rail nnd. ,ate.r,. no:t l.ea:st because, of the 
difficult '1'10liking' conditions of lorry drivers;; 
Jn. Welcomes the sstre:ngthet:d:n:g o·f the Community merchant fleet by tiH' 
iH:t"I"'SHillll or Ore~Cl', and call:; tlp01l l'hc ~,:ommissinn .u~d tht' l'OUIICi 1 
to lll.lk\' UH~ of thiH opportunity to tormuJaLL,• and i,m:plPment. a 
Community shipping policy benefiting alJ 1'1ernber States~ 
11. Expects that, in the context of the afor~men.tioned Communit.y 
shipping policy, Greek ac.cession must also constitute an 
ohli•Jation to 11'1\provc maritime ~:.~afety standards, porl and flag-sl..ill' 
.inspections of vessels, and the social conditions of seamen; 
12. NeleoJ'I\es the challenge which the accession of Greece presents to 
Conununity transport policy and is convinced, subject to ,the rapid 
adoption by the Council of a comprehensive transport infrastructure 
policy, of the overall benefits which Greek membership will bring 
to L11e Community tlransport soc tor; 
I l. calls for <l comprehensive inquiry into the effects of the 
application of Community 1aw on existing small transport 
undertakings, 
1.4. Inatructs itS President to forward this resolution to the Council 
and the Comit\ission, and the Transport committ7es of the National 
Parliaments, 
I INTRODUCTION 
B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
1. This is the first time that the Parliament has chosen to consider the 
problems posed by the accession of a new Member State with regard to the 
transport sector.· Transport is always under-estimated as a key regulator 
of the economy, but the accession of Greece poses such new and interesting 
problems that they are worthy of a special report for the consideration of 
Parliament. History should teach us that nations and alliances are built 
upon the efficiency of their transport systems - this is true for example 
of the United States, Canada and India, to quote several obvious examples. 
And equally it would not be possible to even consider the concept of a 
European Community if transport links did not exist to bind that Community 
together. It is a point that all the institutions of Europe choose largely 
to ignore. Greece, therefore, poses a particular challenge because she 
is the first Member State of the Community, divorced by sea and land from 
her partners, upon whom the success of membership will be tested to a large 
extent by the transport infrastructure. We might also learn useful lessons 
for the future development of the Community in general. 
2. Greek accession poses problems in the following significant ateas: 
a) land links by rail and road to the rest of the Community, 
across non-Member States; 
b) sea and air links to the rest of the Community: 
c) condition of the internal domestic transport infrastructure: 
d) the additionb Community resources of the powerful 
strength of the Greek merchant marine fleet: 
e) environmental cdnsiderations of Athens, with regard to traffic. 
3. Each of these areas are considered in isolation, since they are not 
necessarily inter-related. Despite certain decisions already approved by 
the community - decisions by the Council in the matter of marine safety, 
for example, the European Regional Development Fund - it was obvious to the 
rapporteur that existing facilities to develop transport infrastructures 
in a meaningful way have probably been exhausted. Therefore, with the 
accession of future Member States in mind - both Spain and Portugal have 
their own special problems in this area - Parliament should seek the 
opportunity of Greek accession to develop new initiatives, and this would 
essentially require new financial mechanisms, to cope with this challenge. 
Your rapporteur believes that Parliament has the courage to do this and 
shruld not lose the opportunity to encourage the other partner institutions 
of the Community to take up that challenge. 
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II ·~ VJA 1Q: ......... 
. . 
4,. A~proximately 85 ~~ ""'t o·f all in~l'natton•l ~t be.tween 
·S Gr~ece :and the rest of to:be ~i<ty -®ONes tlle ~i~r <?"f ~lavu, 
under ~h agr.eement of 18.6.);9'59. 1-'bue f~ end 1~1 ~t.Um.e of 
. 
passa.g·· for CQ.Uijl\Ufl.it.y ·tJ:\a·tfi-e ·tQ ar»! ~011 ~-..ce •:if. ~.J.u::t. :itl of the 
greate~-t econ<>mie .. .-n«J pol·i'!:i.eaJ. - •i'f.OUJ.cMce. "'lbu .t.· ..-.uoi%1' t.r.ue 
of pas~age viA AIUI~~:"ie. ,Mu:f\i-4$ to.n.c¥ to be the natuJ:al jtUtetMI\ 'lor road 
and rail traff;ia. Af~r tM Ji9Aat\lt'e of tbe co-o~is ~t 
between the QC and YI.Jgotl.avi,-. t.b,t-.1 y..-~. the ..P~.QblAa of ~ tnnaport 
wae placed on a nw t~iDf.• r.ol:Lwt-119 a~cuttiPn to tl\41 CQIIIUflity, 
Greece may not ~· tu~t~ bil4teral nego~~t~tt w.~h ~lavia 
concerning ,.rroite to c~~ Y~l•v te~t'itory, a1tbou9b ~ ·~eport 
activity i.61 ot tO. ~~t -t~.i.IJ'if~e.a~ to t.he G~:•k ~ {aee !:»elow). 
Until 1977, a d~iofl mc~4 .. reby G.a:-Mk trP..,.~l.Jw tra:f-fic was 
levicao at only 5<;>% ot • l.evy •pacUie<l by tn. Gr.Nk Go¥erAIIIirlt. fJ.'h:i.JI waa 
ur~_.il.at..J"a;J..ly ,:ai'1Jed to lao% ,by B1tl9t:..U •t t.~ .end o·f that yar.. There 
is a ~im:i.h.r ~ituation witb J:e<J!t.t:d w levies on Gr.- t.r~ eroaaing 
Austrb. Th4'! Greek C)OVf!;!:'N~~ent believets that th_b ,ia a pr~ area· for 
a Comm~.,Jn.it;y ~nithtive with re,ar-d to l.-vie• PU .try YU.,.lavia and 
Austria concerning what is essentially in~a~c~nity t~~. Such a 
problem ha~ n9t arisen betore Gr•ek ~cce•eion ~ po .. • epecial considerations 
for the ComJnunity in it• ulationllhips with non-Me.tnbe:c Stet••· 
s. Qreece h~s tew opportunitie• to dictate ~rma. An analysis of 
co~~rative transport coat• to au~ope is •• followaa 
a) transport of agricultural ~oai.Jce fro. Macedonia to 
~union by roa4, twenty tonne• of cargos 65,632 ~acn..a, 
:i.ncl.udinq pa .. ap talC in Y\lfJOilavia, 6~624 clraclwaa aft(! in 
Auatria, 5,950 dracnma-.r 
b) qo~b~ned tf•n•P9rt, including terry, r.t.rae - Trieste: 
77,6QQ 4raQ'tlaafit 
c) rail tr~naport, 20 ton• of cargo, Ger~ny to Greece: 
12~.000 d~ao~,. 
6. The alternative of ~ling the •eastern S.l~an' route through other 
co~unist st~tes t~ the .a•t a44s, •~cording t~ tbe Ministry of co-
, 
o~ination in Athena, a turtber ?0/75~ to costa incurred crossing 
Yugoalct.v:l-. 
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7. During his talks in the various Greek Ministries in July of this 
year, your rapporteur gained the impression that Athens considered it 
unfortunate that the issue of permits/costs with regard to Yugoslavia was 
excluded from the EEC/Yugoslavia co-operation agreement, since Greek 
accession was so close. 
8. Since fuel costs are likely to continue to escalate Greece sees no 
immediate likelihood in a reduction of transport costs and this will 
clearly have a major bearing on the ability of Greek industry tooope with 
the challenges of the common market. Greece may seek a new market for 
agricultural produce in other partner states of Europe, but has a clear 
and increasing burden in exporting that produce which other Member States 
do not bear to the same extent, in terms of trans-Yugoslav, trans-Austrian 
transport costs and tariffs. Equally, traffic from other Member States 
to Greece will share the same burden. This of course is not the•sence 
of the common market and it is clear to the rapporteur that this unique 
situation calls for special consideration. If trade is to increase 
between Greece and the other Member States of the Community, it ought not 
to be subjected to a handicap of this kind. 
- 9 - PE 67.501/fin. 
9.. This question has important political implications. An increase in 
traffic between Greece and the :test of the community will c·learly pose 
probleihs for the transport infrastructure in those cowntriEh!l wh:i.eb carry 
that traffic but which are rlot Nemtler states, priltlc::ipally Y:~mil:lav:l.a and 
Au.str ia. To what extent should the Cortimunity consider inves:tmel\,t in 
nap-member countries? This has been faced to a certain extent already 
with regard to the trans-Alpine links. The accession of Greece gives a 
I 
major new significance to the problem - but there is an eYSS!E!lltial difficulty. 
The Community has not: yet devel()_ped an effective policy fior improviJHJ 
transport infrastructures w,itb.in Member States, let alone those which lie 
ou,tside the political if not the economic orbit of the Coltiimtnity.. The 
' 
rapporteur draws the committ-ee's attention to the report by 
Mr BUTTAFUOCO (Dod, 1•218/00} concerninej investment in non-Member States. 
101. Yet there are demonstrable reasons, outlinai above, why the Community 
should consider investment of this kind, principally because the road and 
rail networks crossing Yugoslavia and Austria at"'e now, as a direct result 
of Greek accession, to form a:i(ial routes of the Community itl!lelf. 
11. Road routes through Yugoslavia have been considerably improved, 
principally with tl'e aid of funds provided by the World Bank. The same 
kind of development has not taken place to the same axtent with regard 
to railways. 
12. Whatever improvements have taken place already are likely to be 
subjected to increased pressure through the objective of closer contact 
between the Community and iu new ME!mber State and are certain to 
require; at least, continuous review. The rapporteur is convinced 
that the Community must devote an urgent review to this problem, ·in order 
to identify the necessities and determine what degree of infrastructural 
assistance might be necessary. 
13. A further review might consider the economic possibilities of road-
rail 'piggy-back' transfer of lorries via Greece and Yugoslavia. 
14. At the Elame time Parliament should e:>bserve that the lack of a common 
tiansport policy or an infrastruatural investment policy - outside the 
parameters of the European Investment Bank or the Regional Fund - is 
beginning to impose impossible restrictions on the development of Community 
trade in generaL '!'here is nEiled for impetus in this atea. prompted by 
Greek accession. F\lture uncertainties with regard to energy supplies 
should encourage early recognition of this problem. 
15. ~here is a particular problem with regard to lorry permits. The 
Co~ission finally propos~.a total of 95 authorizat~ons, which would 
appear not to be objective. The criteria adopted do not seem to take 
into account the distance travelled. For counbies on the periphery of the 
Community, such as Greece, one authorization per year means on average 
fewer revenue-earning journeys than for central Member States of the 
Community. To give an example, the maximum number of round trips possible 
for a Greek lorry to and from the rest of Europe works out at around 
24 - thus 24 x 47 = 1,128. This is not generous. The fact that Community 
authorizations depertd upon the reciprocal goodwill of Yugoslavia and 
Austria constitutes a new factor. 
16. Your rapporteur entertains doubta on the wisdom of the quota system 
in general, which seems to him to place an element of restriction on the 
free movement of intra-community trade. Greece does not fit easily into 
a quota system designed for states which either share land frontiers or 
'water bridges': it is clear that the quotas, as applied to Greece, 
require instant review as a step towards the process of total abolition. 
1At its meeting of 4 December 1980. The Council decided to give Greece 
76 duthorizations, the same number of authorizations as Ireland in 1980. 
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17; Tqe Greek Oovernme.nt has fully appreciated the stra;teq;ic :tmpa+tance 
of improving: road and rail infrastruc.tu:re conneetioJ'iS' to the borders of 
non-Melrlber States, but this of cou·rse ha·s been wi:tbia the present 
contex~: of trade with the Membe-r States of the ac. I.t is; t:herefcre clear 
that if· tra&e is to inerease and th~.u~ falfil the a::Lma o:f Greek member-
ship, then art element o·f revi.w will be· reqaired. 'l'!le ma.j,0adty O!·f trade 
with the community t:ra:vels by roa-d, thau~ tllE!re is a si:cj'Jli.fieaat 
proportion of rail traffic. On thll: whole, road trcm;sport enjoys a 
better developed infras.tru•c::ture~ Rail links with other Mt!mber States 
suffer from the historical lack <:tf development of the Greek rail net.wMk 
in gene'rat. Thus improverttent o'f Hil links to Yugoslavia for instaaee 
(in particular, the Thesalonika-Idomerd. line) bas t)o be considereG within 
the context of the ovfta11 intprov~'t of the Athe.ns-Thesalonika trunk 
line. 
18~~ The rapporteur retrom~t~ends that notwith&ta.nttinq work eurrently under 
way to ir&p:rove both road and rail links to the Yugoslav 1!3or4e:rs, consider-
ation should be ghen to a spe.c:ial study commEincing :frcm a period, say; 
six months from the date of aecession ovEir at. least 18 months to review 
the co·nseq~aences o·f a presumed increase in traffic fl.ow :between Greece 
and the other Me~r States. Such a study could, in uditic:m* provide 
valuable data conclu.sions which miqht form a useful basis when the 
accession of future Mea\ber States is aonsidered • 
• 
V I~TgRNAL GREEK TRANSPORT SYSTEMS 
Road 
19. For the purposes of a discussion on this subject, the rapporteur 
has assumed that the whole of Greece, excluding the Athens-Piraeus conurb-
ation, will be eligible for assistance from the Community Regional Fund. 
20. However, a discussion on the value of Community interest in the 
general improvement of the road network must allow for the fact that, of 
the three ·main traffic generating zones in Greece (Athens, Salonika and 
Patras) Athens is by far the most significant. There is therefore an 
element of artificiality in excluding Athens itself from such discussions, 
since the capital is a prime motivating force in the economy and therefore 
in the related interest of the Community. The rapporteur affirms that 
the Regional Fund once again, in this area, demonstrates inflexibility 
with regard to the pursuit of wider Community policy. 
21. As with the railway system, the backbone of the highway network is 
the mainland coastal route from Patras to Thessaly via Athens. From this 
spine radiate the roads which are often the only fbrm of land communication 
to provincial centres and peripheral regions such as the Ionian Coast, the 
continental mountain regions and the south-eastern Peloponese. A recent 
survey has shown that road supply in non-urban Greece is higher in the first 
and last of these regions, whereas most of Macedonia and all of Thessaly 
fall below the national average. Generally this reflects the distribution 
of population, but some regions still suffer from a poor level of 
communications, especially in the border areas by some parts of the 
Yugoslav and Bulgarian frontiers. Most importantly, remote villages, in 
mountain areas particularly, are not always connected to the network at 
all, even though 61% of the national and provincial network runs through 
areas designated as either hilly or mountainous. Morphology dictates 
that most of the mainland roads should run along the coast in what are 
essentially north-south flows. Natural obstacles do much to impede 
traffic, producing in classical fashion missing links of which the most 
prominent are the Arta-Trikala route across the Pindus and the detour 
around the Gulf of Corinth. 
22. Construction and maintenance standards differ greatly in quality. 
Almost all (93%) of the national system is classified by the Ministry 
of Public Buildings and Works as having a 'good' asphalt surface. The 
same .is true of only 40% of the provincial system. Road width surveys 
provisionally show that.87% of the national system is wider than 6m, while 
half the provincial system is less than 6m. Pavement of motorway standard 
accounts for just 790km of the national system (8.9%) almost all of which 
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is" on the Patras - Thessaly route. 21% of the provincial network is 
officially regarded as being in Jj>oor or very p00r c::o-nd:i:tion.· As might be 
expected, it is the remote regions which need easy communications the most, 
and which experience the highEist incidence of. bad road. 
23. Most of the routes suffer from problems of alignme·nt and gecometry, 
even such major links as those between Volos. and Trikala, and Thess;alonika 
and Alexandroupolis. Not enoug'n is kn<>wnal:>out the characteristics of some 
important roads and bridges to asses their suitability £or future traffic. 
In-built safety is absent: for example, there are no cene.ral reservations 
on dual carriagewa:ys and few barriers· on mountain roads. Road n·umbering. 
arid sign posting likewise need improvement. 
~~~~~~~~!2_2!_~~9 
24. In common with otl~er regulations no·t coming into effect at the time 
of Greek accession, implementation of regulations covering the age of 
' drivers and the hourS' they work (Rflgulation 543/69, a:.s amended)· has been 
deferred. Article 128 of the Act of Accession suggests tla t this 
applies in the case of national transport operations till l January 1984, 
whereas Article 144 suggests a general deferral until 1 January 1982. 
The inference is that international transpo·rt operators and drivers will 
have to comply with regulations by this date. The harmonization of 
training levels may also be deferred in the case of internal traffic, 
again until 1 January 1984, and laws governing t::he recognition of 
qualifications (Council Decision of 12.12.77: see also EP opinion, 
OJ c 125/78) take effect on the same date. 
25. No roadworthiness test exists on a regular basis in Greec:e at 
present, though the Transport Ministry has taken note of Community 
roles on this point and is prep~~:ring to introduce the necessary national 
legislation. A long deferment has been obtained however, with 
~ January 1985 as the limit for internal vehicles, and 1 Ja.nuary 1983 
for international o,nes, when Greek drivers will be required to produce 
documentation (probal.bly at bo'.t'der crossing posts} that their vehicles 
have been inspected and passed. 
2.6. Admission to profession: under Article 128 (Annex VII) deferments 
have been <;ranted to hauliers in order to take acc.t>unt of rights acquired 
Jnder similar circ;:umstances. These expire in 1984, and pertain to certain 
operators mentioned in Regulations 74/561 and 74/562. At present there 
are no real qualifications for entry otier than fact of ownership. 
Law 383/76, however, restricts national truck operating licences to 
those disposing of 200 tonnes or more. There is concern as to whether 
this is compatible with Community competition rules. In any case, some 
observers feel that such rules are in fact putting long-established small 
firms off the road, despite the fact that the size of their operation 
might be more efficient under prevailing conditions in Greece. 
27. The rapporteur suggests that the use of Community instruments to 
improve the general status of the Greek network must therefore cover 
Athens. 
28. Athens itself presents another kind of problem. As the major 
economic magnet in Greece, 57% of all the private cars circulating in 
the country are in Athens and most of those trapped in a permanent 
around-the-clock traffic jam. This has significant consequences viz: 
i) it slows down the movement dgoods and people, 
ii) wastes fuel resources (which continues to cause the 
Greek Government concern), 
iii) environmental pollution. 
29. With regard to the last, one of the most immediate consequences 
from pollution by the internal combustion engine in Athens is damage to 
the fabric of the Parthenon. 
30. Public transport in Athens is poor and unreliable, largely because 
of traffic conditions. There is one electric railway (due for expansion 
into a Metro system) and a network of bus and trolley-bus services. It 
is clear that the Athens authorities are doing what they can, but in 
general, principles of modern traffic management regretfully do not 
apply in the city. It is equally clear that only substantial in~estment 
will present a cure and, at a time of economic restriction, this is as 
difficult to locate in Greece as in other Member States. 
31. The rapporteur is certain however that Athens is the key to any 
general discussion or programme of improvements to Greek transport 
infrastructure. 
32. Therefore he recommends that the Community should assist with studies 
on future traffic management in the Athens - Piraeus corridor and consider 
the question of investment to improve matters. Since this is unlikely to 
be feasible under the Regional Development Fund, this instrument once 
again demonstrates its inflexibility. 
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:33. Greek railways have dev:e1oped - or rather, not developed.- .in iwolation 
from tho community .n·etwork in generaL Hi.storic reasons for this .include 
instability following the war., and .scarcity of resources in <Jeneral to 
make improvements. 
34. This lack of development has lef,t a legacy of neglect., :slowfPeeds 
•·. 
(hearly 8 hours by passenger train from Athens to .Salonika) ~ inadequa.te 
infrastructure, out~dated equipment and poor traffic receipts. 
Nevertheless, Greeks say they would u·s·e their .b:'.a•iDs if .ol'll.:y the 
system were b,et!ter. The Government equally r~eco:g'ni:zes that ·the .railway 
sy:stem has a contributio.n to make in the field of energy saving. 
35. Further handicap.s include .a substantial milea~ of track in the 
Peloponnese J~~Thich i;13 o.f met·ric ... non-standar<i ·gauge, .pr.ese:nting in itself 
l 
a barrier to the free movement .of trade. 
Ji 
36. Discus·sions have been in.itiated with the Community conoernio.g certain 
i~t~provements to the status of the rail network under tbe B.egional 
Fund. Thes.e are of enormous value, principally those involving the up-
grading of the Athens - :Piraeus trunk., which would allow for instance a 
reduction of more than half in the travelling time .by rail between the 
two cities. An i·mw;ovement on this rout.e would remove substantially 
the pressure on domestic air U.nks which ·currently folOU the only 
practical high sp(aed link betwet!n tbese two centres .. 
37. Rail was still the second most important mode of transport for 
i~ternational goodlil in 1973. This positio.n has now been lost to road 
tfaffic. Similarly, the level of int•rna.l activity has decrea.sed in 
s~gnificance, with the railways responsible for just 6~ of passenger 
traffic and 14% of goods traffic. The volume of passengers and merchandise 
carried in 1978 is ~.stimatecl at ).0. 7 million persons (1,5,68 million Pkms) 
and 3.6 miU.ion tonne$! of goods (85.4 M.Tlgn). 
38. The failure of the HR01 to maint•in its position in the transport 
market is due to the limited service it is able to offer, in te%\ms of 
m~eting specific nee<l!;l, regularity and speed. For example, the track 
between Athens and Thessaloniki has limits which keep trains from 
travelling faster than 100 kph .generally, and which forces them below 
5S kph at several points. on the line to Patras, the maximum is 80 kph, 
with conditions often slowing trains below 50 'kph. The prevalent single 
line track causes congestion, and even in ideal (uncongested) conditions 
1 Greek National Railways 
.. 
it is not of sufficient standard to take high speed tra~fic. It is old 
and lacks modern signalling equipment. Tight curves and aeep gradients 
protract an already lengthy journey time. From Athens to the Yugoslav 
\ 
border, it takes over 9 hours for a distance of 586 kilometers (e.g. Paris -
Amsterdam= 554 kms: TEE time: 5 hrs, Express 6 hrs: Cologne -Munich= 
635 kms: TEE time 6 hrs 10 mins, Express 7 hrs 5 mins). 
39. Since'the creation of the HRO, several plans have been put forward, 
after reviews by the HRO itself and by consultants. Among the 
recommendations are: 
i) realignemnt and electrification of the main standard 
gauge track, 
ii) reduction in number of level crossings, 
iii) doubling of track where justified by use, 
iv) modernization of signalling equipment, 
v) review of policy for expensive branch lines (e.g. Peloponeae). 
40. In considering the particular problems of freight traffic, the 
reports underline: 
i) lack of international goods handling facilities especially 
at borders (e.g. Idomeni), 
ii) lack of door-to-door service (i.e. in competition with road), 
iii) international facilities undeveloped (e.g. road/rail, 
sea/rail), 
iv) lack of policy towards commercial customers. 
This last point i~ an important one. There are only 250 industrial 
sidings in Greece, many of which are operated by long-established 
private customers, who provide the only regular source of funding after 
government subsidies. 
41. 23 projec~s are listed in the HRO's long-term plan. They are 
grouped into 3 by priority, the first (A) group itself subdivided into 6. 
The main and most immediate aim is the modernization of the Patras -
Idomeni corridor, which includes the main Athens - Thessaloniki link 
(cost 16.6 bn Dpx) and, purchase of new rolling stock (3.4 bn Dpx). Much 
of the preliminary work has involved feasibility studies and the 
development of alternative packages to suit the HRO's resources. By 
means of these improvements, the railway hopes to offer a service 
which will include as its main feature a journey time from Athens to 
Thessaloniki of 3 hrs 50 mins. In order to achieve this target, the 
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PJ;Oj-ec,ts inc lucie .r.erouting (to elimina:te aur;ves with radii of less than 
.,. 
2 ,ooom and gcradients af g!'eat.er tban 16%.) and t:unneJ.,ling:,, .notably .an .a 
seat ion of ·track between Tithorea and Dom.akos • .I~ add:it:ion., sections of 
tr.ack will be upgra~ to al.low .speeds o·f 1'50-220 k_ph. With ,e:xtension of 
th~s work to Idomeni, the time to the Yugo.slav bo•rder •Wi.ll ;be ha.l.:ved, 
from 9~ hours to 4 hr.s 30 mins over a new track dis.tance of 541 kms. 
42. ~ork ha·s already started on 'the :tnoi-Lari&sa part cf <thirs p'iau .. , with 
reconstruction tak.ing place ,along 27.8 kms of track. Electric sti.gnalling 
equipment is being installed., and plans .drawn up for EWen:t.ual e1ect.:rif.i.cation. 
The consultants for this ,project are T:r.11ns~k., a .subsidiary o:f 'Br·itd.sh 
Rail. So far they ha¥e compl..,ea s±u:d.i.es for the :kthens - Cba.lld::s and 
Athens - Idomeni link., g.ivin'9 .aclvice on a wide range .of top-ics -from choice I . . 
of line to lay-out O.f .station fa.cd.litie·s .• 
43, As the plans stand (and proj.eets mig'ht well ·be tackleil out of turn) 
there are no ,plans for expansion .of 
except as part of a ·general attempt 
(e.g. Thess:al.<>I'tiki - Kanthui link). 
the .r,a..ilweys .iato ar-eas "h.ithe.rto unserved, 
to improv·e a partielilllar .rCl)ute 
Even th«m -s·uch p~s a%'8 -earemely 
low in priority. ':l'he big'h cost of new constru-ct:kom is inlstr,umental in 
preventing SllCh growth. Similarly, improvements to r.ou"tes in tbe 
Peleponese, and between Kozani and :Kalambak& aX"!e also towar6s the end of 
tE list. When the -effe.ct of the improvements are felt (W'hicl\ should be on 
a widespread scale in aboat lO years 1 time~ theareas henef:i.'t:in:g .most will 
be those already !!)ear the ex!is·tin-<; main routes., or .near new :deviations. 
'l'he fact that Athens and Thea.s,aloniki wil!l. llle within a day 1 s return 
trip of each other should be tihe :most impo.rtant benefit. J:t will 
relieve pressure on the airways paa:-ticuliu:'ly,, Which now carry ;IDU:clil 'Of the 
day-trip pa.ssengeOC"s (oft-en blilsines:smen). ''ii'he ,Souther.n Peleponese al'ld the 
west coast however 1 will still have •to r-ely on sea, road .and air 
transpo:rt. 
44,. The .pg:-oject also rests on the ability ,of tlil:e \RR(l) \to finance the 
projects, t!ilking into account the fact that~ qiv.en eucb a ~ri.01d to 
compleu the ta.sk, costs are bound to escalate, -even with >maximum 
productivity by those .executing the work. 
45_.. By Article ( 2) o:f :OL U00/72 the State qave the HR.O 5 bn drx 
towairds the improv.ement of track and the modernization of in·stalJLations. 
Article 5 of the same de·cree m.ade the state respoAsible f.or .all maj.or 
expendituJ:.e on development {e .. q. ·cli!viations, signallin-g .eq.uipment, 
electrification). It is 911Jo E"e$PGnsli.ble .\ilnde:r Article 8 f.or repayments 
and interest on the DO's starting capital for an initial period o.£ five 
years which may be extended to provide money for new rolling stock. A 
further 100 m drx has been agreed with a German consortium, and negotiations 
are at present under way with the European Investment Bank.for a loan 
towards work on the Athens - Thessaloniki line. 
All these sums, however, do not come near the total required to 
finance the long-term plan, which amounts to 47,700 m drx. 
46. Given the completion of the mainline development programme to the 
Yugoslav borde~ trade and travel between Greece and Europe will be greatly 
facilitated by the HRO's development plan. The connecting link to Voles, 
with a ferry service from there to the Middle East, will also play a great 
role in the passage of goods to and from the Community via Greece, and 
indeed this latter route with the line to Athens ·form two areas of great 
importance to the Community. Given the Greek Government's determination 
to put the HRO back into the forefront of transport (both internally and 
' internationally) much productive cooperation can occur within the field 
of the railways. There is much to be done, so that all investment will 
be spent on worthwhile projects. It is likely that missing links of track 
in Yugoslavia would be eligible for improvement funded by the Community. 
47. Where problems might occur is in the field of negotiations concerning 
compensation for passenger service obligations (1191/69), the normalization 
of accounts (1192/69) and compensation for infrastructure costs and 
research (1107/70). Of these, 1191/69 has already been amended so that 
compensation rights under sub-paragraph 2, Article 6(3) and subparagraph 1, 
Article 9(2) take effect on 1 July 1982. 
48. The question of producing normalized accounts has proved of 
difficulty already in the case of the EIB negotiations. Given.the state 
of the Greek railways overall, it is difficult to see the basis for 
direct comparison with other European networks at this stage, seeing how 
much is to change in the next few years. Indeed, the compensation aids 
f.or research under 1107/70 would seem the most pertinent regulation in 
Greece's case. Paragraph 59 of the second Biennial report on railway 
undertakings (COM(79) 447 final) notes that 'the Commission is setting up 
a market observation system which it is hoped ••••••• will be of use to
1 
and utilized by railway undertakings for their own future planning'. Any 
planning advice to Greece should take place very soon, before the HRO's 
final plans are ratified since changes at a later stage would be very 
expensive. More discussionE likely to take place over the subsidization 
of routes that are not profitable, and their improvement without pre-
established guarantee of use or return, which might be seen by the Community 
as uneconomic use of scarce state resources. 
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N 
0 
INDEX OF SELF FINANCE FOR COMMUNITY AND GREEK RAILWAY ORGANIZATIONS 
(In millions of national currency, 1977) 
BRB FS ( l) 
13,940 1,109 20,798 20,786 
TR 1,825 5,198 122.2 25,251 3,116 3,320 2,322 62,173 36,064 
= .73 = .30 = .73 = .ss = .70 = .33 = .44 = .33 = .57 
SGR: Self generated revenue 
TR: Total receipts 
N.B. Includes BVS revenue 
(l) in thousaftd •illion lire 
. 
HRO (i) HRO (ii) 
3,395 
5,330 
= .63 
(1978) 
----
3,044 
4,544 
= .67 
(1977) 
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so. On account of the large rumber of Greek islands and difficulties 
involved in transporting bulk goods.by land, cabotage {coastal sea tra~e) 
plays an important role in the carriage of both trade and passengers. 
It should be noted that by law all cabotage is restricted to Greek flag 
vessels. 
51. The last census {1971) shows that 15% of the Greek population reside 
on 169 islands. The communication requirements of island inhabitants and 
the island economy differ according to their location and resources. The 
Ionian Islands are near the mainland but still removed from the main areas 
of Greek economic activity. The largest islands, Rhodes and Crete, are 
ten or more steaming hours away from Piraeus. The traffic patterns here 
differ very much from those other islands such as Aegina and Spetses 
which are reached in under an hour. Small .. islands, such as Mykonos on 
Idra depending mainly on tourism for income, do not require car ferries 
• 
with 4.5 metre car decks in the same way as the fruit exporting islands 
do. Some have esoteric requiremen~such as facilities for berthing water 
tankers. we can compare the situation with the differences that exist 
in the shipping services from Scotland to the Western Isles and from 
England to the Channel Islands or the Isle of Wight. 
52. Because of the significance in the development of the Greek economy 
of the internal ferry links, the improvement of these links - principally 
in ferry infrastructures - must form an ingredient of community thinking. 
53. The Greek Gbvernment would be most unlikely to surrender the principle 
of cabotage reserved to Greek carriers - they would for example, cite 
strategic reasons for this - but the rapporteur feels that the lack of an 
effective element of competition does lead to a reduction in the quality 
and efficiency of the service offered. 
54. However, an improvement in efficiency would contribute to community 
policy- in energymving, for example. The rapporteur feels that a 
discussion should be initiated concerning ways in which the ferry services 
might be made more competitive while satisfying the desire of the Greek 
Government to preserve the principle of cabotage in full. 
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Ports 
55. The Ministry of Merchant Marine has overall responsibility for all 
ports and access channels. All but two ports are administered under th~ 
old system of Port Funds and Port committees. Port Authorities however 
were set up for Piraeus (1930) and Thessaloniki (1970). Reorganization 
arid redistribution of roles was carried further in Law 649/77, by which the 
MMM'lcontrol of staffing, planning and priority ranking was established, 
while the MPW2 was vested with responsibility for. technical studies and 
aon~truction. Day-to-day control is exercised by the Port Committee of the 
Nomos (except in Athens and Thessaloniki) which is nominated by the head 
of Nomos, who in turn comes under the control of the Ministry of the 
rnt~rior. In all no less than five ministries exercise some form of 
fin~ncial or administrative control over the Port Funds. The efficiency of 
sucp organization is yet to be established. 
56. Revenue 
These come from various sources: 
i) port charges, 
ii) allocations from (a) Import tax (75%) 
(b) Export tax (14%) 
(c) Oil/petrol tax 
(d) Tobacco handling tax. 
Piraeus and Thessaloniki have revenues which generally exceed their 
operating expenses. This is not so for the other ports, who must rely on 
other sources. These include: 
i) loans from banks, 
ii) soft loans from Public Investment Bank (574 m drx in 1979) 
iii) grants from Nomos Authority. 
The repayment terms of many of the loans mean that the debts are 
effectively never repaid. 
Year PIB contributions to Ports 
1970 257) 
1971 327) 
1972 368) •' 
1973 301) 
·1974 273) 
1975 187) Million Drachmae 
1976 356) 
1977 345) 
1978 384) 
1979 574) 
1 Ministry of Merchant Marine 
2 Ministry of Public Works 
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Cargo traffic in Greek ports 1976 20 top ports 
Foreign goods I Port (million tonnes) Domestic Total Comments 
" Elefsina 8.87 3.16 cement, bauxite, 12.04 
iron ore, coal 
Piraeus 5.4 3.26 8.62 grain, general 
cargo 
Isthrnia 7.6 1.01 8.62 Corinth canal 
Thessaloniki 
' 
6.64 1.94 8.58 grain, cement, 
magnesite 
Megara 3.26 .18 3.44 oil terminal 
Volos 1.01 1. 93 2.93 cement 
Laryrnia 2.02 2.13 2.33 coal 
llalkida 1.11 .52 1.63 cement t 
I tea .88 .65 1.53 bauxite I 
l 
Antikyra .79 .69 1.48 
Rio .72 .68 1.41 
Iraklio .17 1.22 1.39 
Thira • 03 .97 .99 poz.zaM>na, 
pummice, betonite 
Laurio .01 .69 .77 
Kavala .55 • 30 .70 manganese 
Milos .51 .13 .64 bentonite 
Souda .OS • 34 .39 
Rhodos .01 • 32 .33 
-
" 
Kyrnasio .21 .09 .30 
Patras .15 .08 .23 cement 
(corrected figures) 
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57. Four projects take up the majority of funds available for the imprdve-
m~nt 0f port facilities: 
i) Piraeus - new wharf at St. George Keratsini 
ii) 
iii) 
iv) 
Thessaloniki - new pier 
Patras) 
Voles ) new ferry berths and facilities 
58. Concern has been expressed in some~arters as to whether the current 
building programme should not be slowed down till a full study of Greek 
Ports and their future has been completed (such a study was proposed after 
the 1977 reorganizations). While some projects obviously merit attention 
(for example, the projects at Voles and Patras mentioned above) some of 
the figures used to support programmes are disputed. The plans for 
container facilities at Piraeus are said g~eatly to exceed the demand 
created by domestic and transshipment traffic. Similarly the capacity of 
certain medium size ports is said to be less than a third of their annual 
throughput. It is argued that maximisation of present facilities, including 
improvement of warehousing and upgrading of present machinery, should 
precede large-scale construction of further facilities. 
59. Here one returns again to the significance of Piraeus. Ther~ is a 
view that the port represents an opportunity to develop a south Mediterranean 
Europort and the Greek Government is certainly of the opinion, with some 
justification, that community interests would be valuably served by the 
development of Piraeus as a southern bridgehead for traffic destined for 
the rest of the Community to be land-bridged by road or rail via the 
domestic Greek transport infrastructure and that in Yugoslavia. 
60. Thus we return again to the rapporteur's belief that the Greek 
transport infrastructure (together with that of certain neighbouring 
countries) has to be viewed as an entity for the purposes of possible 
Community investment. 
61. ngain - if Piraeus is outside the regional area - the RDF will not 
prove a satisfactory instrument for investment in the port, which cou!d 
we11 serve wider Community interests. 
62. The rapporteur recalls that ports are not, as yet, included in the 
Community's proposed transport infrastructures policy and that, in the light 
of this one case alone, it can again be seen as an unfortunate exclusion. 
63. In any case, the upgrading of transport links to and from Piraeus, in 
the immediate neighbourhood, affect the economic functioning of the port. 
The rapporteur feels therefore that the status of Piraeus with regard to 
Community investment warrants special consideration. 
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VI MARITIME SECTO~ 
Introduction 
------------
64. In contrast with other areas of Greek transport, shipping is well 
documented and there are plenty of statistics available from both Greek 
and independent sources. Statistical analysis, however, while helping to 
give a profile of the Greek Flag fleet does not provide a comprehensive 
understanding of Greek shipping, since some Greek shipowners neither operate 
from Greece nor fly the Greek flag, for example, the influential Greek 
shipping communities in London, New York and Monte carlo. This discussion 
confines itself to Greek flag vessels since it is extremely difficult 
accurately to establish the beneficial ownership of a vessel. Moreover 
it is at governmental level that international shipping conventions are 
concluded, just as lists of fleet sizes and casualties are traditionally 
returned on a national basis. 
Difficulties also arise from the fact that shipping can be quantified by 
various standards, such as the actual number of vessels, their displacemlnt or 
the type and amount of cargo they carry. An illustration of this latter 
problem is given by the fact that Japan has 1,525 tankers on the flag 
registry, with a combined GRT of 749,000 GRT. This is less than the combined 
GRT of France's three new ultra-large crew carriers (823,644 GRT), which 
are also nominally tanker vessels. 
65. Shipping statistics age relatively quickly. Ships, being a commodity 
as well as a means of conveyance, are bought and sold as the market 
fluctuates. They also have an inherent scrap value. The ~ale of a vessel 
can often entail the change or loss of flag. The figures given below are 
those from Lloyds shipping statistical tables, except where stated, and may 
be said to represent the position in mid-1979. Further qualifications are 
given as dictated by the subject in the text itself. 
66. In 1958 the Greek flag accounted for just 1.36% of world tonnage. By 
1968 the figure was 3.81%, and by 1979 it had risen to 9.04%. From fourteenth 
place in 1~58, Greece now occupies third position in the league of shipping 
nations, behind Liberia and Japan. Without the same direct backing from 
international petroleum companies that the former enjoy and certainly without 
the vast economic structure of the latter, Greece still managed to increase 
its fleet five-fold in the last decade, catching and overtaking all othef 
European countries. When Greek owned tonnage is takeninto account, 
i.e. tonnage controlled by owners of Greek descent or origin not flying the 
Greek flag, Greece is the second largest shipping nation aier Liberia, with 
over 52 million GRT. 
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67. The major reasons for the growth are: 
i) 
ii) 
low rilk investment of tanker and bulk carrier owners in 
the early 1960's: 
the closure of the Suez Canal following the Israeli- Egyptian 
war and the establishment of the round-Cape route to 
Europe by which chartering rates were pushed up and ships 
were often being fixed (chartered) before they were on 
the stocks: 
iii) repartriation of. Greek-owned vessels to the Greek fleet 
and the registration under Greek flag of vessels that 
would otherwise have been operated under a flag of 
convenience. 
!~~-~~~E~~!~!~~-~!-~~~-~E~~~-!!~~~ 
68. A characteristic of the Greek fleet when viewed in terms of GRT (seebelow) 
is that it has proportionately less tankers in its fleet than other 
leading shipping nations and considerably more dry-cargo vessels. Bulk 
carriers, single, and twin-deckers, when reckoned with passenger/cargo ships, 
form 50.5% of registered tonnage, whereas the figures for France, Denmark 
and Liberia are 19%, 29% and 24% respectively. Where tanker tonnage forms 
over half these three countries' fleets (Liberia- 61%, France- 64%), it 
is but 30% of the Greek. No other type of vessel represents a significant 
proportion of the Greek fleet. In this respect, Greece is similar to 
·r.iberia, Norway and the USSR. It is unlike the countries of Northern Europe, 
United States and Japan, all of whose fleets contain a much larger element 
of unitized vessels, Germany and Denmark being very strong in this respect. 
If we divide the Greek tanker and bulk fleet by size (see below), 
it is possible to see the type of vessel favoured by owners. There are only 
two ULCC's greater than 140,000 GRT under Greek flag, out of a world total 
of 138. Every EEC maritime nation has more of these vessels than Greece, 
bar Belgium with none, and the Netherlands which also has two. France and 
the United Kingdom both have twice as many vessels over 100,000 GRT, and 
Italy again has just as many. Where Greece stands out is in the number of 
vessels between 10,000 and 40,000 GRT (63% of all tanker vessels) and those 
of less than 2,000 GRT (24% of all tanker vessels). It has relatively and 
l 
absolutely fewer ULCC's and a large number of the Panmax and Aframax 
vessels, as well as a sizeable number of small tankers - probably parcel 
carriers and inter-island supply vessels. 
1 Panmax vessel: vessel constructed to set specifications which allow it 
to carry an optimum amount of cargo through the Panama Canal. 
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TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
TANKER 
PRODUCT 
CARRIERS 
OBO 
BULK 
CARRIER 
GENERAL 
CARGO~ 
UNITIS~D 
TONNAGE 
FERRIES & 
PASSENGER 
VESSELS 
TUGS & 
DREOOERS 
FISHERY 
VESSELS 
RESEARCH & 
ICEBREAKER 
OTHERS 
BEL F DK 
a b a b a 
16.38 .17 64.5 4.42 53.42 
8.62 1.71 3.53 4.68 1.03 
5.1 2.3 
44.55 .97 8.43 1. 23 12.3 
16.1 35 11.1 1.62 17.0 
6.2 .91 3.31 3.22 8.9 
2.6 .06 1.21 .20 4.32 
3.7 .55 .6 
o. 7 1.42 1.31 
-
-
.02 1.17 .17 
1.03 .74 1.01 
VESSEL AS % OF: a) National fleet 
b) Wor 1d fleet 
b 
.17 
.64 
• 83 
1.14 
3.99 
.33 
a 
33.0 
.59 
.so 
20.1 
28.1 
12.1 
1.72 
1. 23 
1.49 
.12 
1.02 
D GR I NL GB 
b a b a b a b a b 
1. 62 30 6.45 42.9 2.88 42.2 1.31 47.6 7.64 
.56 .17 .69 2.3 2.98 .16 .96 4.7 14.5 
.16 6.64 9.37 16.6 7.33 7.8 8.27 
2.1 33.4 15.25 19.7 2.81 12 .79 15.9 5.42 
2.95 27.1 12.4 9.35 1.34 28.9 1.9 11.6 3.97 
8.41 .11 .32 1. 78 1.69 6.5 2.85 6.5 14.7 
.20 1.66 .85 5.52 .89 2.4 .18 2.3 .89 
0.08 .62 3.2 1.21 
.11 .73 1.7 • 61 
.01 .1 .08 
.09 .56 1.47 1.1 
w 
0 
l 
VESSEL 
TANKER 
PRODUCT 
OBO 
BC 
GC + PC 
UT 
IF£RRIES 
Liberia Panama 
a b a 
61.57 28.81 28.38 
2.21 19.99 1. 77 
10.48 3.22 2.38 
20.04 19.97 23.06 
4. 61 4.60 36.63 
.86 5.73 2.25 
.09 1.02 . 1..87 
a = % of national fleet 
b = % of world fleet 
b 
3.64 
4.06 
2.01 
6.29 
10.01 
4 .• 09 
5.77 
COMPOSITION OF FLEETS 
Norway USA Japan USSR 
a b a b a b a b 
54.96 7.05 43.30 4. 36 43.05 9.88 21.09 2. 77 
6.04 14.99 4.75 9.25 2.06 9.14 • 60 11.52 
10.53 8.88 .46 .3 8.29 12.57 2.05 1.77 
16.68 4.56 10.7 2.29 23.73 11.60 5.78 1.61 
6.36 1. 74 20.76 :4· 31 11.1 5.44 33.05 9. 27 . 
.99 1.80 13.35 19.o8 9.13 16.7 1. 20 2.24 
2.24 6.92 1.15 2.78 2.4 13.27 2.84 8.98 
69. As far as bulk carriers are concerned, ownership once more concentrates 
at the middle to lower end of the scale. In common with all other shipping 
nations Greek owners prefer handy-sized Panmax bulkers, while also controlling 
a high proportion of smaller vessels (8,000 - 9,999 GRT) of this type. 
(See below) 
70. The profile of vessels operated by Greek owners is to a large extent 
reflected in the share of world tonnage they control. Greece's 50.5% of 
dry-cargo vessels make up 27% of the world fleet. Its 12.7% of general 
cargo vessels is unmatched, and only Liberia with 19.97%of world bulk 
carrier tonnage surpasses Greece's 15.25%. In comparative terms Greece 
owns as many dry-cargo vessels as the EEC combined. The third of the fleet 
made 'JP of tankers forms just 6.4% of the world tanker tonnage. However 
within this division Greece controls over 13% of all tankers between 10,000 
and 60,000 GRT, once more with a high proportion of Panmax vessels. The 
greatest share of tanker tonnage is controlled·by'Liberia with 28.81%. 
The UK, Norway and Japan all own more than Greece. They also benefit from 
large internal demand for crude oil and have major oil companies registering 
their vessels under their flags. 
71. If Greece's participation in the two main markets stands out, then its 
absence in the field of specialized tonnage is also noticeable. It controls 
but 0.7% of all product carriers, and 0.32% of unitized vessels. In both 
cases it is at the bottom of the league of major shipping nations. In 
comparison to their small tonnage contribution to the Greek fleet, ferries 
and oao1 vessels still form a significant part of world supply at around 
9% each. 
72. The major portion of Greek merchant marine is engaged in tramp-trading 
and it is unusual for Greek owners to fix their vessels on long-term time 
charters unless they are taking advantage of a particularly high market or 
have been required to do so by the terms of their financing arrangements. 
At the time of writing, Greek interest in the tanker market is low with 
chartering managers in Piraeus not predicting a change in this pattern for 
some time to come. However, in the dry-cargo market there is evidence 
of interest in the 17-60,000 DWT size of ship with Greek vessels being 
fixed for 12-month period (time charter) business in the US and Persian Gulf. 
73. Despite its large fleet, Greece does not carry as much of its own two-
way trade as might be expected. In 1976, 26 million tonnes of goods,,was 
unloaded fromvessels of all flags. Of this amount only 10.3 million tonnes 
was unloaded from Greek vessels. Greece takes a moderate part in its·own two-
way trade and a much lesser part in the liner trade between other countries. 
1 'Ore-Bulk~Oil': Vessels capable of carrying a variety of ores and crude oil. 
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TANKER VESSELS IARGER THAN 
140,000 100,000+ 60,000+ 40,000+ 20,000+ 10,000+ 6,000+ 4,000+ 2,000+ TOTAL 
GREECE 2 18 21 52 99 123 6 9 102 432 
l;lELGIUM 17 
DElDWU< 11 2 0 3 23 8 0 5 25 77 
.FRANCE 6 39 13 10 2 5 6 7 17 105 
GE~NY 5 10 5 2 4 3 1 4 70 104 
ITALY 3 18 4 12 16 37 10 29 154 283 
NETHERlANDS 2 9 2 1 17 7 2 1 35 76 
UNI'l'E,O Kilii'GOOM . 17 50 13 10 31 102 7 13 176 419 
LI~Rl,A 34 195 120 104 159 128 29 10 14 793 
NOJUfAY 24 44 32 5 7 20 2 10 29 173 
JAP~ 5 88 33 20 25 9 13 111 1.221 1,525 
WORLD 'l'O'l'AL 138 542 342 374 715 1,000 235 642 2,962 6,590 
• 
w 
w 
U1 
0 
..... 
......... 
HI 
.... 
::::1 
. 
Ore & Bulk Carriers 
Greece 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
:Italy 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Liberia 
Japan 
World Totals: 
140,000 + 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1 
1 
1 
4 
100,000- 60,000 - 40,000 -
140,000 90,999 59,999 
3 8 24 
- -
5 
- - -
2 8 4 
-
5 7 
2 16 18 
- 1 -
3 24 22 
12 51 64 
4 64 30 
. 31 260 160 
20,000 - 10,000 - 8,000- 6,000 - Total 
39,999 19,999 9,999 7,999 
151 540 52 15 793 
17 2 
- -
24 
11 20 - 1 32 
10 19 2 3 48 
37 6 
- -
55 
33 66 5 3 143 
15 10 
- -
26 
54 99 4 10 217 
306 446 56 9 945 
112 159 27 15 412 
l 
1,158 2,378 364 183 4, 638 
Its Vast capacity, white used to carrying an above average share of national 
~rade, is mostly u•e4 in ·croas~ad~ng. Many vessels are cba~tered on the 
'spdt' market, cempet:i.ng for cargoes on a voya9e beaie. It ie important 
to distinguish this ty,. of cross-trading from the liner 'conference' 
trades with their f~x~ tariff• and variety of ear~a carrie• to several 
~ort$ of di~charge, which a~e not so attractive to Greek owners. 
£~!~!!!:~-!:!22!9 
74 •.. classified retuf'Nl pul:lliahed by the Liverpool Undltrwritera Association 
show that 93 GrllS~ fl.~IUJ· vu.-eb .of an •«Nre,ate 626,447 GM' were recorded 
as total losa•s .in t~ Y$~. 1979. 'fhi.a aeans ~t Gnek flacJ losaea 
represent~Q ~6.~% of al~ •hips over 500 GRT, ~nd 27.~ of all tonnage, lost 
through ~rine cauaea. during the preceding 12 month pa~iod. 2.26 ~illion GRT 
from 279 cas\,lal.tiea we.J"e rec.o:J.'ded fo:f the whole world in thU peJ:iod. There 
is, therefo~e, no ia~QWe-.8t over the figures for 1978 when Greek losses 
were listed by the Live~pool Undftrwriter11 As·aociatioo at 74 vessele of 
·~65~681 ~~~ In 19.79 Ia( vessels accounted for just 24 ab~ with an 
aggregate of 160,,793 QaT. 
!~!!~~!!!~!!_£99Y~2~!~~! 
75. Nearly all the ~j~ IMCO re~ulations h•ve been ratified by the Greek 
Government. By the te~~s of the IMCO agre~nt Greece ia. in any ease, 
obliC!Jed to ratify c<mV4lntioas once t.h& condition• for their entry into 
force. have been met. ~he record for ratification was a relatively slow one 
but several gaps hawe recently ~n closed, notably with the ratification 
of SOIJ\S 1974, by Greek l<lW· 1045/70, and the itapending ratification of a 
fund for compensation of oil pollution damACJe (entered into force in 
October 1~78). Greek law 314/~6 ratified the International Convention 
on Civ.:i,l Liability fQ.;" acd~nts, and Gre.ece ia at pnaeftt. preparing. to 
adopt the 19.7~ ~n~nt of the l,9.66, Loadline Con'V'entiQQ. Two major 
conventions und~r the aus.pices of IMCO. na.mely MARPOL an-d Standards of 
Training ce.rti:Ucation and. Watch Keep;i.ng fo:J Se~f<uers,. will. do much to 
improve both pollution ~ntrol measures &Qd the ~t•~ of seafarers, 
once entered into force. Requ.l.ationa ~once.rning the segl'e~tion of 
ballast tanks, the pro.vis ion fol:' inert gas. and cl:'\lde oil washing syst.e.ms, 
have already in:fi11,1enced owners. in their e;ho.ice o·f vtutsel., even though they 
seem unlikely, for procedu.ral reasons,. to co.IJie in.te> forc:e: in the near 
future. 
76. In addition to these technical convention·•· many Greek owners of 
tankers are party to the T~LOP and CRI~L agreement•, which cover financial 
liability Cilfte:t: oil spills (:t;or example 'l'OVALOP fuad,ing wa·S' used during 
the fight against pollution £liQJII the Cristos Bitas.) • 
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NATION 0-4% 
Denmark 47.78 
Belgium 46.44 
France 34.94 
BRD - West Germany 32.31 
Liberia 32.68 
United Kingdom 31.6 
Japan 28.04 
Italy 26.34 
Netherlands 24.34 
Greece 13.63 
(!)Insignificant percentages 
AGE STRUCTURE OF FLEETS (% of Tonnage) 
5-9% 10-14% 15-19% 20-24% Fleet % 
aged 0-14 
30.22 15.74 - (1) - 93.74 
29.84 17.5 - - 93.78 
47.54 12.97 
- -
95.45 
44.31 17.41 - - 94.03 
41.65 17.2 - - 91.53 
44.01 14.46 
- -
90.07 
48.13 18.94 - - 95.11 
30.90 15.78 12.5 8.45 73.13 
31.56 25.53 13._35 81.43 
22.34 27.27 17.5 13.39 63.24 
!~~E!~~!~~-e:~~!~~:!! 
77. The technica·l inspection of a ship is carried out by two agencies·, the 
classification society to which the vessel belongs, and the government 
inspectorate of the nation of registry. Historically, the fol'Mel', or 
'class' surveys ware intended to provide some form of guarantee to insurers 
and underwriters, that the vessels they insured were being well~constructed 
and maintained. The latter or 'flag' inspections stem from legislation 
enacted to ensure the well being and comfort of crew and passengers. The 
totally safe ship has not yet been constructed. Shipbuilding is an 
empirical science often becoming wiser after some tragic combination of 
circumstances (vide the development of watertight doors on ferry vessels). 
Class and flag surveys attempt to pre-empt reasonably foreaeeable 
accidents. They concern the vessel alone. Crew standards come under 
different laws. An inexperienced master, or a chief engineer with forged 
papers can endanger the most modern as well as the most ancient vessel. 
78. The overwhelming majority of Greek vessels are 'in class', 
i.e. they have maintained standards of repair and overhaul during a 
continuous cycle of inspection or at an annual examination. Only a small 
and easily identifiable number of vessels are out of class, and they are 
subject to the 'flag' inspection procedure. The MMM has inspectorate& 
in Greek ports, and in 18 overseas locations. OVer the past two years the 
number of spot checks have risen by 50%. 
79. Since 'class' and 'flag' requirements often overlap, or may be 
conveniently and economically carried out at the same time, the Greek 
Government, in common with many other governments, has entrusted the 
execution of some 'flag' inspections to various classification societies. 
This enables vessels which never trade near Greece or the overseas 
inspectorate& to be examined. A point at issue in this matter is whether 
in fact the MMM would be able to enforce Greek flag regulations without the 
use of class surveyors worldwide. 
!~~-!9~-g~~!~!~~ 
80. From the table below it may be seen that the Greek fleet is a relatively 
old one. This is partly explained by the number of passenger vessels 
(which have a longer working life) and the number of ships taken out 
of service, but not scrapped. Greek owners are also able to trade ships 
which are at the end of their economic life at a greater pro~it than 
other ship-owning nations. While only a small percentage of the most 
successful Greek owners commission new buildings, few reputable 
owners are interested in 'overage' tonnage. 
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81. Notwithstanding the above, 37% of the Greek fleet is 15 years old 
or older. The risk of total loss or damage beyond economic repair is 
known to increase with age. In order to discourage the ownership of 
such vessels, the Greek Government has brought in a law preventing the 
new registration of vessels over 17 years of age under Greek flag. 
It does not continue to trade after this time, subject to compliance 
with 'flag' requirements. 
82. The Greek Government gives priority to encouraging registration 
under the Greek flag as well as increasing the competitiveness and 
reputation of the Greek fleet. To these ends legislation has been 
introduced allowing owners of Greek vessels a priviliged position with 
regard to tax and foreign capital. The latest of these measures is 
Law 959/79 'concerning shipping companies', continuing a policy of tax 
exemption, which extends to cover the costs involved in running shipping 
agencies on shore. As a further incentive to re-patriate, owners 
employing Greek crew on non-Greek flag vessels are required to contrib-
ute to the Greek seamen's pension fund. 
In the past five years 700 vessels of 9 million GRT have come to the 
Greek flag that were previously under other flags. This figure does not 
include those registering new buildings in Greece who might formerly 
have chosen to do otherwise. 
It is not possible to judge whether this policy will succeed in 
the long-term as owners are still weighing the pros and cons of operating 
under the Greek flag. 
Steps have also been taken to provide new building of finance for 
Greek vessels. At a time when interest rates are high, cheap Government 
finance including moratoriums on repayment are a very persuasive reason 
to build a ship for registration in Greece. 
83. In addition to help for shipping agencies mentioned above, the 
Government is trying toinprove the shipping infrastructure in various 
other ways, to maintain the level of young people becoming sailors. 
With the growth of attractive well-paid shore employment there is 
a problem in manning ships. 
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8 4. Insofar as the success of the Greek Merchil.nt Marine is based upon 
a free trading pol:i,cy em. the higl:l •as, the rapport;eqr believes that 
nothing should be do~e wit,h regard to the ~utu;-e development of COJQmunity 
policy which m;i.ght restrict the trading policies of indivi4~a.l .. Ner 
sta.teli! .• 
85. Clearly Greek a.ccession presents all opportunity for the practical 
dev.elop~nt of Community shipping pqlicy, but thie shoijld R;l t lea4 to 
any measu.res which might be interpreted as a stratification of trading 
policy. 
e 6. viewed in the lig,ht of Greek accession anC!. the sqbsequ.~t ma..jor 
addition to the Community mercha,n.t fleet, the rapporteU.r sees as the 
priorities in this area: 
i) the general improvement o.f safety standardli! and 
both port and flag..,state insP•ctio,n. of vessels: 
ii) improving social con.qi t;io;l).s :!Qr SJeamen: 
iii) development of community policy wit'h regard to liner 
conferences (even though Gree.c;:e :i.s not a significant 
operator in this area): 
i v) the preservaticm, for the benefit of the community and 
wider general .i,nteresbs, o:f a vigorous, economically 
succ.essful merchant marine in all the Member States7 
_,...._ 
v) the development of Golllmunity policy in general 
with regard to the preservation of the e.conomic 
base of the merchant m.arine within the Communit};'. 
In the course of his visit to Greece from 22 - 25 July 1980, the 
rapporteur held meetings with the following: 
Minister STEFANOPOULOS, 
Minister to the Prime Minister 
Minister FIKIORIS, 
Minister of Merchant Marine 
Minister KONTOGEORGIS, 
Minister for EEC Affairs 
Mr ~TIGIS, 
Secretary-General, Miniatry o£ Coordination 
Mr ANDREOPOULOS, 
Director-General, Ministry of Coordination 
Officials of the Ministries of: 
Transport 
coordination 
Public Buildings and works 
Merchant Marine 
Centres for: 
Economic Planning and Research 
Political Research 
Union of Greek Shipowners 
Pan-Hellenic Seamen's Union 
Hellenic Railways Organization 
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